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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Antonia Kate Fuller asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate error in the 
district court’s order granting her motion to suppress.  The district court suppressed 
evidence seized after Ms. Fuller was stopped for crossing the line on the right side of 
the roadway.  Ms. Fuller’s vehicle was searched pursuant to an inventory search and 
methamphetamine, prescription drugs, and drug paraphernalia were located in the 
vehicle.  The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the officer did not have 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Ms. Fuller was violating the law.   
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Officer Harvey Ballman observed a vehicle being driven by Antonia Kate Fuller 
cross the fog line and then again touch the fog line.  (Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 1.)  
Ms. Fuller was not weaving within her lane of travel and she did not swerve; however, 
the road curved to the right and her tires touched and crossed the fog line.  (3/28/16 
Tr., p.6, Ls.1-8.)  Officer Ballman stopped the vehicle for failing to maintain the lane of 
travel, a violation of I.C. § 49-637.  (R., pp.7-8.)  Ms. Fuller had an invalid driver’s 
license and did not have insurance.  (R., pp.7-8.)  Officer Ballman arrested Ms. Fuller 
for the invalid driver’s license and failing to display insurance.  (R., pp.7-8.) 
When an inventory search was performed on Ms. Fuller’s vehicle, officers found 
drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine, and two Hydrocodone pills.  (R., p.8.)  Based 
on these facts, Ms. Fuller was charged by Information with one count of possession of 
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methamphetamine, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of invalid 
driver’s license, and one count of failing to maintain insurance.  (R., pp.54-56.)   
 Thereafter, Ms. Fuller moved to suppress the evidence arguing, in part, that she 
was seized in violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and the evidence 
gathered against her should be suppressed as fruits of the unlawful seizure.  (R., pp.52-
53, 56-63.)   
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress.  (See generally, 
3/28/16 Tr.)  At the hearing, Ms. Fuller’s counsel and the State stipulated that 
Ms. Fuller’s vehicle’s front tire crossed the fog line.  (3/28/16 Tr., p.3, L.10 – p.4, L.1.)  
That stipulation, combined with the officer’s dash-cam video recording (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 
No. 1 to the Suppression Hearing), constituted all of the evidence introduced at the 
hearing.  (3/28/16 Tr.)  After hearing argument from the parties, the district court took 
the matter under advisement.  (3/28/16 Tr., p.4, L.22 – p.15, L.9.)  The district court then 
held another hearing during which it orally granted the motion to suppress, finding that 
the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439 (2015), was fact-
specific and did not hold that crossing the fog line was a violation of I.C. § 49-637.1  
(4/1/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-25.)  The court found “that the principle of law articulated in Neal is 
that the fog line is not a road barrier,” but is “a warning that one is getting near the road 
barrier.”  (4/1/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.22-25.)  The district court found that touching or crossing 
the fog line is not a violation of Idaho law, and, because the sole basis of the stop was 
                                            
1 Although the parties stipulated that Ms. Fuller’s front tires crossed the fog line (3/28/16 
Tr., p.3, L.20 – p.4, L.1), the district court told the parties that it had watched the video 
and found that the tires touched, but did not cross, the fog line (4/1/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.12-
19).  Ultimately, the court accepted the stipulation.  Id. 
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the purported traffic violation, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity by Ms. Fuller.  (4/1/16 Tr., p.6, L.12 - p.7, L.10.)   
The district court held that Ms. Fuller was unlawfully seized, and the evidence 
obtained as a result of the seizure was inadmissible.  (4/1/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.16-22.)  The 
district court granted the motion to suppress for the reasons it stated at the April 1, 2016 
hearing.  (R., pp.84-85.) 
The State appealed.  (Augmentation, pp.1-5.)   
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ISSUE 
Did the district court correctly grant Ms. Fuller’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Granted Ms. Fuller’s Motion To Suppress  
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
  Ms. Fuller moved the district court to suppress the evidence seized because the 
traffic stop was not based on reasonable, articulable suspicion that she was driving 
contrary to Idaho law and thus violated her constitutional rights.  This Court should 
affirm the order granting Ms. Fuller’s motion to suppress.   
B. Standard Of Review 
 
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a 
motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. 
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). This Court will accept the trial 
court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 
416, 418 (2014). “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court.” State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013). This Court 
exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the 
facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.     
 
C. The District Court Correctly Granted Ms. Fuller’s Motion To Suppress  
 The State has not challenged any of the district court’s factual findings in this 
appeal.  As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts found by the 
district court, the district court erred in granting Ms. Fuller’s motion to suppress.  
Ms. Fuller submits that the district court’s ruling granting her motion to suppress was 
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amply supported both by the evidence and by governing case law, and that this Court 
should therefore affirm the district court. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  State v. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho 482, 486 (2009).  Fourth Amendment protections have been incorporated to apply 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2  State v. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).   
“When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of 
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable.”  Id. at 811.  In addition, 
even brief detentions of individuals must meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of 
reasonableness.  Id.  This means that the detention must be both justified at its 
inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that originally justified 
the interference in the first place.  Id. 
When the discovery of the evidence to be used against a defendant was the 
product of his illegal seizure, it is rightfully suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”  
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963).   
In Neal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho Code Section 49-637 “does not 
provide any definitions that clarify what is meant by ‘within a single lane’, or, more to the 
                                            
2 Although the attorney who presented and argued Ms. Fuller’s suppression motion 
made a general argument that Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment, citing several Idaho cases in which the Court 
found the Idaho Constitution provided greater protections (R., pp.52-53), no specific 
authority was cited regarding traffic stops such as the one in Ms. Fuller’s case.  
(R., pp.52-53; see 3/28/16 Tr.)  Therefore, Ms. Fuller will rely upon Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in this appeal.   
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point, ‘as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.’”  Id.  159 Idaho 445.  The 
Neal Court thus concluded the statute was ambiguous where it was reasonably 
susceptible to more than one meaning.  Id.  In its analysis, the Court held “any 
ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of a reasonable operation of the law.”  
Id.  (quoting Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 177 (1977)). 
The Neal Court found that “[I.C. §] 49-637(1) regulates the interaction of traffic 
between lanes, not a driver’s interaction with the sidewalk, curb, or shoulder.”  Id.  
Section 49-630(1) does not prohibit driving anywhere on the right side half 
of the roadway except sidewalks, shoulders, berms, and rights-of-way.  
Construing this section together with 49-637(1) does not prohibit driving 
on an edge line in the roadway.  There was no allegation here that Neal 
was driving on the shoulder, therefore, he was still in the roadway. 
   
Id.  The Court found that the edge line’s “purpose is not to create a lane boundary but to 
inform the driver of the road’s edge so that under certain conditions the driver can safely 
maintain his or her position on the roadway.”  Id. at 445-446. 
 The Court held: 
Where the lines are absent, the edge of the road is considered the curb, 
and it is an unreasonable interpretation to conclude that where there is a 
stripe near the edge, the inside of the stripe marks the limits of where a 
driver’s tires can go, but where it is absent, the curb—which would be 
located at the outer edge of the painted line—marks those limits. 
 
Neal, 159 Idaho at 446.  The Court found that fog lines were painted on the roadway 
itself, and not on the sidewalks, curbs, shoulders, etc.  Id.  The Court held that “[t]he evil 
to be remedied in this statute is to prevent dangerous, unsafe movement out of a lane of 
traffic and into another lane of traffic.”  Id. at 447.  That is, I.C. § 49-637(1) “regulates 
the interaction of traffic between lanes, not a driver’s interaction with the sidewalk, curb, 
or shoulder.”  Id. at 446. 
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While the Neal Court limited its holding to “driving onto but not across the line 
marking the right edge of the road,” the Court provided no additional reasoning to 
support a conclusion that simply crossing the edge of the fog lane, while maintaining 
travel on the roadway, constitutes a violation of I.C. § 49-637(1).  Further, the plain 
language of the statue does not give drivers notice that crossing the fog line is a 
ticketable offense.  The language requiring drivers to drive their vehicles “as nearly as 
practicable” within a single lane does not lend itself to a conclusion that failing to do so 
is a violation of Idaho law.  I.C. § 49-637(1). 
In this case, the district court found: 
The Court did review, as I indicated previously, the dash-cam of the 
arresting officer or the -- yeah, the arresting officer.  The Court could not 
conclude from that view of the video that the tires had all the way crossed 
over that line; however, I’m accepting that stipulation of fact by the parties 
and so the Court deems that if they crossed over, it was a little bit.  But the 
parties seem to agree that it crossed -- the tires crossed over completely.  
 
(4/1/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.10-18.) 
 
The district court held: 
 
The Court reads the Neal case in a way that I don’t think supports the 
State’s position in this.  I’m going to grant the motion to suppress.  The 
State’s position as the Court understood it was that the Neal case was 
fact-specific and it was. 
 
The facts in the Neal case being that the Court determined that the tires of 
the vehicle going onto the fog line does not constitute a violation of traffic 
code, but that by implication or by reasonable inference, tires crossing 
over the fog line does violate traffic code. 
 
There was quite a bit of language that the State referred to and quoted it 
appropriately.  However, this Court finds that the overall reading of the 
Neal case is of -- and I don’t understand quite the phrase that the State 
referred to -- but the overall reading of this case leads the Court to the 
conclusion that the principle of law articulated in Neal is that the fog line is 
not a road barrier; the fog line is, in fact, a warning that one is getting 
close to the road barrier. 
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Therefore, it makes sense that tires traveling onto the fog line does not 
constitute a traffic violation, it just constitutes driving on the warning line.  
And the Court also finds that crossing over the fog line under these 
circumstances did not constitute a traffic violation.  The Court could see 
even if the tires crossed over just a little bit where it completely crossed 
that fog line, the vehicle did not leave its lane of travel.  It did not drive off 
the road.  It stayed on the lane of travel.  Getting towards the edge, for 
sure, but maintained its lane of travel. 
 
That’s why the Court asked the State, Is [sic] the basis of this stop purely 
the traffic violation?  The answer to that question was, Yes [sic].  And so 
based on that theory that the basis of this stop was purely the traffic 
violation, the Court finds that there was not a traffic violation here and 
therefore there was not a reasonable basis on which to pull Ms. Fuller 
over. 
 
(4/1/16 Tr., p.5, L.6 – p.6, L.18.)  The Court added that it would have considered 
Ms. Fuller’s vehicle drifting within its lane of travel—touching the fog line twice—as 
possible indicia of inattention, sleepiness, or possible DUI, but the State only argued 
that it was a traffic violation, “and therefore, no reasonable and articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity from which the law enforcement was justified in pulling over Ms. Fuller.”  
(4/1/16 Tr., p.6, L.19 – p.7, L.10.) 
The district court correctly suppressed the evidence seized as the result of the 
search of Ms. Fuller’s vehicle where Officer Ballman did not have reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that her vehicle was being driven contrary to Idaho law.  Where 
Ms. Fuller merely crossed the fog line but did not leave the lane of travel, she was 
complying with the statute requiring “[a] vehicle to be driven as nearly as practicable 
entirely within a single lane.”  Ms. Fuller respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
district court’s order suppressing the evidence.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Ms. Fuller respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s Order 
Granting Motion to Suppress.  
 DATED this 14th day of November, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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